Capturing the Canon by Barron, Jerome A.
CAPTURING THE CANON 
Jerome A. Barron* 
INTRODUCTION 
In this paper I have reflected on the nearly twenty-five years 
I have been involved in editing a constitutional law casebook. In 
the process of examining the various editions of the casebook to 
the present, I realize, more than I otherwise would have, the 
fundamental way that developments quite apart from the inten-
tions of the editors-in politics, in the Supreme Court, and in the 
academy-continuously redefine the canon and thereby trespass 
indelibly on the original goal of a short, concise teaching tool. 
This survey demonstrates that the essential constitutional law 
canon is ever flowing but not always in anticipated directions. In 
the prefaces to the book's five editions, forecasts were some-
times made about a bright new future for dormant constitutional 
clauses which appeared suddenly to have come to life. Yet by 
the next edition they were shown to have returned to the slum-
ber from which they emerged. After a quarter of a century of 
experience, my conclusion is this: The canon can neither be de-
fined, predicted nor confined; it resists capture. The following is 
an account of how the dominant events and issues of the times in 
which each new edition appeared continuously changed the 
canon and reshaped the book both in substance and form. 
I. SIZING THE CANON 
The first edition of the constitutional law casebook of which 
I am one of the editors was published in 1975.1 When I signed a 
contract in the early 1970s with Bobbs-Merrill (later Michie and 
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1. Jerome A. Barron and C. Thomas Dienes, Constitutional Law: Principles and 
Policy, Cases and Materials (Hobbs-Merrill Co., 1975). 
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now Lexis-Nexis), it was my intent to write a short casebook on 
constitutional law. At that time I was teaching constitutional law 
in the evening to part-time students. The book I used, Lockhart, 
Kamisar and Choper / was excellent; but for my purposes it was 
a very big book. The book, as casebooks do, reflected the schol-
arly interests of its editors. Accordingly, there was a lot of mate-
rial on state taxation of interstate commerce, on freedom of re-
ligion, and on constitutional criminal procedure. Constitutional 
criminal procedure by this time was becoming a subject of its 
own; it soon comprised a separate course in criminal procedure 
as it continues to do today. I no longer covered it. I did cover 
freedom of religion in those days but state taxation of interstate 
commerce not at all. So the result was that there were large 
chunks of the book that I was not using at all. The book was 
about 1400 pages long. In the four hour course that I taught 
then, it was not possible to cover the entire casebook or indeed 
the major part of it. 
Why not, I asked myself, edit a shorter casebook which re-
flected what I did cover? I discussed it with the publishers and, 
on the basis of their travels on the law school circuit, they were 
quite enthusiastic about my casebook idea. The plan was for a 
constitutional law casebook that would be a short, concise 
teaching tool, not a research source book, yet in which the im-
portant ideas and controversies in the scholarly literature would 
be highlighted. The unrealistic objective was to do all this in a 
casebook of about 700 or 800 pages. 
In the middle of all this, I accepted the deanship of the law 
school at Syracuse University. The deanship put the casebook 
on hold. When I returned to the law faculty at GW, the enor-
mity of the casebook project hit me and I asked Tom Dienes if 
he would join me. In 1975 our first edition came out. It was not 
750 pages. Instead, it was 1110 pages. The most recent edition 
of our casebook-the fifth edition published in 1996, which has 
since acquired two new editors (Martin Redish and Wayne 
McCormack)-is 1542 pages.3 In 21 years it has increased by 
almost half. As evidence that constitutional law casebooks (like 
their editors) have a tendency to expand, the following page size 
2. William B. Lockhart, Yale Kamisar, and Jesse H. Choper, The American Con-
stitution, Cases-Comments-Questions (West, 3d ed. 1970). 
3. Jerome A. Barron, eta!., Constitutional Law: Principles and Policy, Cases and 
Materials (Michie, 5th ed. 1996). 
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figures for the successive editions of our casebook are instruc-
tive: 
First Edition 1975 1110 pages 
Second Edition 1982 1139 pages 
Third Edition 1987 1388 pages 
Fourth Edition 1992 1470pages 
Fifth Edition 1996 1542 pages 
The remarkable thing about this inflation in size is that it 
has happened despite the fact that we tried very hard during 
these two decades to resist it. We now have four editors and we 
have the usual differences of opinion over how much of a re-
ported case we should include. But, on the whole, we have tried 
to be faithful to the statement in the Preface to the first edition 
that our aim was to develop a concise teaching tool. 
If a concise teaching tool was our goal, what happened? 
There are a number of explanations. For one thing, the constitu-
tional law course for which we prepared the first edition has 
largely vanished. The constitutional law course I taught at GW 
in the 1970s was a required one semester four credit course 
taught in fifty minute segments four days a week in the day pro-
gram, and two evenings a week in the part-time division for 100 
minutes each. That course covered judicial review, separation of 
powers, federal and state powers, plus individual rights and lib-
erties. Embraced under the individual rights and liberties head-
ing were such massive topics as state action, due process, equal 
protection and freedom of expression. These topics are covered 
today in most law schools by at least two courses. There is a re-
quired three credit course, usually taught in the first year, cov-
ering judicial review, separation of powers and problems of fed-
eralism relating to state and federal powers. But now there is 
also another three credit course, Constitutional Law II, an upper 
class elective taken by most students in the second year. This 
course, sometimes called Individual Rights and Liberties, typi-
cally covers the origins of substantive limits on government, sub-
stantive due process in both its economic and fundamental rights 
incarnations, the rise of the equal protection clause as a source 
of constitutional rights, and freedom of expression and its vari-
ous rationales, categories, tests and standards. In addition to 
these courses, our school, and many others, offer separate three 
credit courses in First Amendment Law, and the Civil War 
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Amendments. Today's constitutional law casebook is used, 
therefore, in at least two courses instead of one. This somewhat 
explains the growth in size of constitutional law casebooks. 
Despite the increased size of today's constitutional law 
casebooks, they still contain notable omissions. To some extent, 
these omissions reflect either curricular changes or develop-
ments in the larger world which should, and do, affect coverage. 
I will use our casebook as an example. The first edition of our 
constitutional law casebook came out right after Watergate. 
Therefore, it gave a degree of coverage to impeachment and ex-
ecutive power which was much more extensive than had been 
true of casebooks in the pre-Watergate world. In our first edi-
tion in 1975 there was a 78 page chapter on executive power and 
an eleven page section of that chapter exclusively devoted to im-
peachment. In our most recent 1996 edition, we no longer have 
a separate chapter on Executive power but instead we have a 
chapter of slightly over a hundred pages entitled Executive and 
Congressional Relations: Separation of Powers. This chapter 
contains no material on impeachment. In that regard, as recent 
events illustrate, we were not very good prophets. The next edi-
tion, I think, will doubtless contain material on impeachment-
certainly on what constitutes an impeachable offense. Casebook 
editors no less than generals are ready for the last war. 
Other changes or omissions from the first edition include 
the entire area covered by civil due process or, as we grandly 
called it then, Due Process in the Noncriminal Context: Some 
New Constitutional Frontiers. This was a chapter of nearly 50 
pages. Its contents reflected the then prevailing Zeitgeist as is 
demonstrated by the section headings: Welfare Rights and The 
"New Property," Constitutionalizing the Consumer Credit Rela-
tionship, the Employment Relationship in the Public Sector, and 
the Due Process Rights of the Student. Although the first edi-
tion appeared six years into the Burger Court, these issues, and 
the Supreme Court cases that considered them, continued the 
agenda of the Warren Court; they were rights-expansive and 
ground-breaking: Goldberg v. Kelly,4 Fuentes v. Shevin,5 Board 
of Regents v. Roth,6 Perry v. Sindermann,1 and Goss v. Lopez.8 
4. 397 u.s. 254 (1970). 
5. 407 u.s. 67 (1972}. 
6. 408 u.s. 564 (1972). 
7. 408 u.s. 593 (1972). 
8. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
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Now, the civil due process chapter is gone. It is gone because the 
cases that the chapter celebrates are no longer fertile terrain for 
new developments in constitutional adjudication. The expansive 
due process methodology those cases employed is no longer as-
cendant. Instead, the relevant aspects of civil due process are 
covered variously in courses on Administrative Law, Civil Pro-
cedure, Education Law, and so on. 
There have been other coverage casualties in nearly twenty-
five years. For example, the first edition concluded with a chap-
ter on Congressional Legislation in Aid of Civil Rights. That 
fifty-five page chapter has now been assigned to the course in 
Civil Rights. Of course, material on congressional enforcement 
of civil rights is still present in our casebook. In the federal leg-
islative power chapter, Katzenbach v. Morgan9 and City o[ 
Boeme10 are given prominence, as is the College Savings Bank 1 
case employing federalism to limit Congressional power to leg-
islate under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, 
this sequence displays a not unfamiliar pattern for topics in con-
stitutional law casebooks, emergence, eclipse and revisionist re-
vival. 
At this point, one might appropriately say: the chapters on 
civil due process and on congressional enforcement of civil rights 
are gone and yet the book in its present edition is still five hun-
dred pages longer than the original edition. Why? Well, for one 
thing, some venerable issues have now achieved radical new im-
portance. Supreme Court Justices and scholars alike are ab-
sorbed with the claims of state sovereignty and the appropriate 
limits on the constitutional powers of the federal government. 
Significantly, there is now for the first time a chapter called the 
The Structure of Federalism, in which McCulloch12 is employed 
to explain federal power and U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thom-
ton13 is used to explain state power in the federal structure. This 
chapter directly follows the judicial review chapter. The promi-
nence of the Structure of Federalism chapter in the front of the 
book is intended to emphasize for the student the critical role is-
sues of federalism have come to play in our constitutionalism. 
9. 384 u.s. 641 (1966). 
10. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
11. Florida Prepaid PostseconiUlry Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. 
Ct. 2199 (1999). 
12 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
13. 514 u.s. 779 (1995). 
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Student reaction and opinion also influence the ever-
changing casebook. In the first edition judicial review and its 
limitations comprised the first chapter of the book. Today judi-
cial review, its landmark cases and the scholarly literature de-
bating its merits still comprise the contents of the first chapter. 
But limitations on judicial review-congressional control of fed-
eral jurisdiction, Eleventh Amendment issues, the case or con-
troversy requirement, problems of standing, mootness, ripeness, 
etc.-now are put in the last chapter at the end of the book. 
Why? Different editors may have different answers to this ques-
tion. My own feeling is that it is a response to students. Stu-
dents come to constitutional law eager to discuss critical consti-
tutional issues such as the abortion controversy, affirmative 
action, and hate speech. If the first topics they encounter are 
Eleventh Amendment issues or tracking the law of standing 
from Warth14 to Lujan,15 we may lose them for the rest of the 
course. Perhaps it doesn't matter where you place a topic in the 
book as long as the instructor can find it. But placement does 
show the priorities of co-editors and the priorities of the Zeit-
geist. 
II. CHANGING THE CANON -FROM PREFACE TO 
PREFACE 
The times, of course, influence not only placement but con-
tent. The preface to the first edition in 1975 exhibited the sub-
stantive signs of the times. We noted that we had adopted a par-
ticular focus on civil rights, that we approached the "enigma of 
due process from the perspective of social science and also in the 
light of the problems presented by a new technology,"16 and that 
Watergate impelled us to give new and heavy coverage to the 
rise of executive power. Substantively, the preface to the second 
edition in 1982 charted some new directions for the casebook. 
National League of Cities17 and its revival of a doctrine of state 
sovereignty as a limitation on the constitutional powers of Con-
gress was appropriately heralded. We made a couple of bad 
calls. We bade a premature farewell to impeachment: "[W]ith 
the passing of the Nixon presidency ... the mechanics of im-
peachment[,] have been relegated to the constitutional history 
14. Wanh v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
15. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
16. Barron and Dienes, Constitutional Law at vii (cited in note 1). 
17. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
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books."18 We noted "[t]he resurrection of the contracts clause 
and its use as an alternative to economic due process. "19 The 
resurrection proved to be short-lived. In the Preface to the sec-
ond edition in 1982, we said we had tried to provide a "more lei-
surely presentation of . . . the[se] cases"20 since our users felt 
some of the cases had been cut too close to the bone. 
By the time of the third edition in 1987, the book's editors 
comprised four teachers and writers in constitutional law rather 
than two. The 1987 preface states that the chapter on judicial 
review provides "student and teacher with the continuing debate 
about the merits of having the Supreme Court serve as the 'ulti-
mate arbiter of the Constitution,' a matter as controversial in the 
era of Ronald Reagan as it was in the era of Thomas Jeffer-
son."21 Garcia22 and its decision "to scuttle National League of 
Cities and once again to extend very large latitude to federal 
regulation of the states qua states"23 were featured. There was a 
dramatic increase in space and focus on separation of powers is-
sues in this edition. These issues included congressional efforts 
to control executive power and to control itself, as illustrated by 
cases involving the legislative veto and the Gramm-Rudman 
legislation. In regard to the individual rights and liberties area, it 
is noted that the equal protection chapter devotes considerable 
attention to affirmative action and gender discrimination and the 
Court's rising unhappiness with the tripartite standard of review. 
By the advent of the fourth edition in 1992, we were ready 
to acknowledge in the preface what the instructors and students 
who used the book had taught us about reporting and editing 
cases. The following account of what we learned explains the 
book's increasing girth: "[A] reported case should not be edited 
too lean. We have tried to report enough of each case so that 
the case serves as an effective teaching tool and a guide to the 
evolution of the Court's approach to a particular issue. We 
have, therefore, chosen not to edit the cases too sharply. "24 The 
fourth edition began with a new feature-an overview of the 
18. Jerome A. Barron and C. Thomas Dienes, Constitutional Law: Principles and 
Policy, Cases and Materials vii (Michie, 2d ed. 1982). 
19. ld. 
20. Id. at viii-ix. 
21. Barron, et al., Constitutional Law: Principles and Policy, Cases and Materials vii 
(Michie, 3d ed. 1987). 
22 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Autk, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
23. Barron, eta!., Constitutional Law at vii (cited in note 21). 
24. Jerome A. Barron, et al., Constitutional Law: Principles and Policy, Cases and 
Materials v (Michie, 4th ed. 1992). 
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"foundations of American constitutionalism" -which included a 
"survey of constitutional development from the founding, 
through the Warren Court era, to the conservative counter-
reformation in the Supreme Court. "25 The rivalries of warring 
ideological movements within the constitutional law academy 
are evident in the fourth edition. The Preface noted that the ju-
dicial review chapter now includes a discussion of the literature 
on republicanism and communitarianism and the critique by the 
Critical Legal Studies movement of the "rights" orientation of 
judicial review.26 We concluded the preface to the fourth edition 
by saying that this was an uncertain time for a new edition of a 
constitutional law casebook: "Two Justices whose views are 
hardly known on many major current constitutional issues-Jus-
tice Souter and Justice Thomas-have replaced Justices Brennan 
and Marshall, whose views on constitutional issues were ex-
tremely well-known and understood. The extent to which the 
new Court will wish to reconsider the precedents of even the re-
cent past is unclear. Thus, this fourth edition runs a greater risk 
that it records constitutional history rather than constitutional 
law than was the case with previous editions. "27 
The preface to every edition of our book has stated as a 
mantra that a primary objective for our book has been to pre-
pare a concise teaching tool. The fifth edition, published in 1996, 
was, alas, far weightier than its slender 1975 progenitor. Not 
surprisingly, we conceded in the 1996 edition that the size prob-
lem is "increasingly formidable."28 We called attention to some 
of the reasons behind the ever expanding casebook: "The Su-
preme Court of today ... consists of Justices who are not shy 
about writing highly individual and separate concurrences and 
separate dissents to make clear where they agree and where they 
disagree with the opinion of the Court. The consequence of all 
this is that the process of condensing a case for casebook pur-
poses has never been more difficult or more important. Fur-
thermore, the law review literature in constitutional law is ever 
more massive. "29 In a kind of cri de coeur we say that the fifth 
edition at around fifteen hundred pages is still one of the shorter 
constitutional law casebooks. Finally, the 1996 preface reveals 
25. Id. at v-vi. 
26. Id. at vi. 
27. I d. at vii. 
28. Barron, et al., Constitutional Law at v (cited in note 3). 
29. Id. 
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that it is a true child of its times; it is available in both a print and 
an electronic format. 
Ill. TEACHING THE CANON 
In 1983, I chaired an AALS Workshop on Constitutional 
Law which was held in Los Angeles. On that occasion as on this, 
there was a knowledgeable group of constitutional law casebook 
editors and teachers. My paper was on a still timely topic: Order 
and the Nagging Problem of Coverage. At that time-more than 
16 years ago-I admitted that whatever coverage I achieved was 
at the expense of omissions of important, perhaps critical, topics. 
For example, I skipped entirely the chapter in that edition on 
executive power. In my defense it was nearly a decade after Wa-
tergate. Remember also that the typical constitutional law 
course was only a single four credit course. I also skipped the 
chapter on civil due process. Why then did we include it in the 
book? Some of those who adopted the book taught civil due 
process and had no wish to abandon that topic and leave it to the 
administrative law teachers. 
In retrospect, I am amazed at how much we did cover in a 
single basic four credit course in constitutional law. We covered 
judicial review, state and federal powers, and I gave substantial 
coverage to equal protection. But, of course, I had to skip cov-
erage in class of the illegitimacy classifications, alienage classifi-
cations and equal access to the franchise. Today when we have a 
separate course in individual rights and liberties of which the 
equal protection clause is a very substantial chapter I still omit 
for class purposes illegitimacy, alienage and protection of the 
franchise cases. 
In 1983, I covered 15J pages of a 200 page chapter on free-
dom of expression. Last year I covered 95 page!: of the 345 page 
chapter on free expression in the fifth edition. In less than a 
hundred pages I tried to cover the rationale of the First 
Amendment, the Brandenburg30 version of the clear and present 
danger doctrine, the content-based/content neutral distinction, 
prior restraint, the O'Brien31 test, the public forum doctrine, and 
various categories of speech, including fighting words, offensive 
speech, hate speech, commercial speech, obscene speech, inde-
cent speech and the issue of what First Amendment standards to 
30. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
31. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
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apply to female pornography, and to child pornography. Finally, 
we examine what First Amendment standards to apply to the 
electronic media. A vast landscape to traverse indeed. Many 
topics in which I have intense interest, and would like to cover 
had we time enough, had to be dropped. These include the flag 
burning cases, speech in special environments, publicly funded 
speech, the First Amendment impact on the law of defamation 
and privacy, media access to information, freedom of association 
and the right of non-association or compelled speech, and free-
dom of religion. 
Of course, I have glossed over the issue of whether given 
the complexity, breadth and scope of contemporary First 
Amendment law that topic ought to be covered in the course in 
Constitutional Law II at all. After all, there is a separate course 
in First Amendment law. This is not an unimportant issue. At 
least two arguments support not including First Amendment law 
in a survey course on individual rights and liberties. First, free-
dom of expression is such a substantial topic that it inevitably 
will absorb too much time in an already overcrowded course. 
Second, it is impossible really to cover First Amendment law 
adequately as part of a survey course; a smattering of First 
Amendment law might be mistaken by students for the real 
thing. On the other hand, the argument for including First 
Amendment law in the survey course on individual rights and 
liberties is that it provides at least some exposure to a large 
group of students who might not otherwise receive any exposure 
to it at all. Secondly, an introduction or acquaintanceship with 
First Amendment law in the survey course on individual rights 
and liberties may create a larger constituency for the separate 
course in First Amendment law. 
At the AALS Workshop on Constitutional Law in 1983, I 
made a general confession of my sins of omission with regard to 
coverage-executive power, civil due process, freedom of relig-
ion and congressional enforcement of civil rights. But I re-
marked that I did conclude my course with the chapter on state 
action. At that time, I remarked that it might be more sensible 
to discuss state action right after judicial review. I didn't do so. 
Instead, I concluded the course with it. This meant that I had to 
discuss the state action concept at a number of places in the 
course prior to the specific discussion of state action at the end 
of the course. Although the state action chapter at that time was 
a fifty page chapter, I said then that I regretted I was only able to 
cover 30 of those pages-and those fairly rapidly. Today, in our 
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fifth edition, the state action chapter is nearly seventy pages. 
But now even though we offer two courses in constitutional law, 
I still don't cover it in either course. Why? Three reasons. First, 
I discuss state action at various points in the course. Second, the 
tail end of a constitutional law course can often turn out to be a 
solipsistic marathon for the professor and a forced march for the 
students. Third, this area of the law is currently comatose as far 
as the Supreme Court is concerned. For all these reasons, I now 
leave the end of the course for review rather than state action. 
In 1983 I speculated on the merits of the solution that was 
then emerging to the hard choices these difficult questions of 
coverage present. At that time many law faculties were moving 
away from the required four hour course in constitutional law to 
a mandated six credit two course requirement in constitutional 
law. Some schools were even considering an eight credit cover-
age-again with two courses. More credits, more courses, more 
coverage. Well, now there are more courses and more credits. 
Has it led to more coverage? In 1983 I was skeptical that it 
would. I said then that I did not think the problem of coping 
with the abundance of material in constitutional law could be re-
solved by increasing the number of credit hours for the course. I 
said it would just expand the terrain on which hard choices 
would be made. I think I have been vindicated in this forecast. 
Many constitutional law teachers then found it hard to fit free-
dom of expression into a single basic course in constitutional 
law. Many constitutional law teachers today find it just as diffi-
cult to fit freedom of expression into the new course on individ-
ual rights and liberties. The emergence of the separate survey 
course in individual rights and liberties has not, in my opinion, 
increased coverage, for example, for freedom of religion, civil 
due process or state action in those courses. 
The situation with many casebooks, even casebooks with 
three or more editors, is that there are whole chapters which 
none of the editors teach. Precious space is allocated to some 
topics just because in an unacknowledged way we believe them 
to be part of the constitutional law casebook canon. Yet we 
really have no firm knowledge that those who use our books give 
those topics any more coverage or attention than do the editors 
who prepare the materials. 
Can any editor, teacher, or group of students manage even 
the whole of that part of the canon a particular casebook seeks 
to capture? The answer is probably not. Currently, the constitu-
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tionallaw casebook tries to serve many needs, yet whether those 
needs are widely shared is not really known. We reach for an 
entire canon but, inevitably, it slips our grasp. Perhaps, case-
books should address the topics those who prepare them actually 
use and then provide an intense and vertical look at those issues. 
All casebooks need not try to provide materials on the whole 
spectrum of the canon. A variety in focus would provide a 
needed diversity and a more manageable task. The curriculum is 
already moving in this direction. Perhaps, the casebook should 
as well. We should admit, if not proclaim, that we make our own 
canon. 
